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BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA
WOMEN'S HEALTH
CLINIC: ABORTION
PROTESTORS ARE NOT
LIABLE UNDER THE
KU KLUX KLAN ACT
SUE MOTA*

INTRODUCTION

Abortion protest has become the largest and, perhaps, the most visible civil disobedience campaign in American history.' Many protestors
who have illegally blockaded abortion clinics have been arrested and
charged under state criminal law and sued civilly by abortion clinics
under state trespass and nuisance laws.2 In addition, these protestors
have been subject to suit by abortion clinics under the Ku Klux Klan Act 3
* Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University; J.D.,
University of Toledo College of Law, 1983, Order of the Coif.
1 See Phillip F. Lawler, An Issue This Paper Can't Sidestep, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1991, at
A13; see also Robin Toner, Die-Hardsin Opposite Camps on Abortion Fighton After Battleground Deserts Them, N.Y. TimEs, July 25, 1993, § 4, at 3 (discussing current status of
abortion protest); David A. Gardey, Federal Power to the Rescue: The Use of § 1985(3)
AgainstAnti-Abortion Protestors,67 NOTRE DAMEsL. REv. 707 (1992) (discussing use of civil
disobedience).
2 See Volunteer Medical Clinic v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs
claimed trespass, nuisance, and interference with business under state law); Northeast
Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.) (plaintiffs claimed trespass and
interference with business relations under state law), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989);
Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990) (plaintiff claimed
nuisance, conspiracy, and negligence under state law).
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 371-372 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1988). See, e.g., Lucero v. Operation Rescue, 954 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1992) (protestors sued by gynecologist and patients
under Ku Klux Klan Act) (the "Act"); Volunteer Medical Clinic v. Operation Rescue, 948
F.2d at 218 (abortion clinic brought action against abortion protestors pursuant to Act);
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(the 4 "Act") and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.

On January 13, 1993, in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,5
the United States Supreme Court held that the Act does not provide a
federal cause of action for abortion clinics. First, this Article briefly discusses the Act and then analyzes the Bray decision in detail. Finally, it
examines a bill recently enacted by the United States Congress which
subjects certain abortion protestors to both federal civil and criminal
penalties.
I. THE Ku KLux KLAN ACT

-

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

In 1871, Congress passed a civil rights act which commonly became
known as the Act.6 Abortion protestors have been routinely sued under
the provisions of the Act, specifically § 1985(3) which provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f two or more persons ...conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or... premises of another, for the purpose of depriving...
any person or class of persons of... equal protection.., or ...privileges
and immunities," the7 injured party may recover "against any one or more
of the conspirators."
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990) (protestors of abortion clinic sued
under Act); National Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding anti-

abortion related services constituted violation of Act), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990);
Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding no
evidence to support claim against abortion protestors under Act); Roe v. Abortion Abolition
Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.) (determining plaintiffs not in class sought to be protected
under Act), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Upper Hudson Planned Parenthood, Inc. v.
Doe, No. 90-CV-1084, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13063 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1991) (plaintiffs
sought injunction under Act); Planned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Holy Angels Catholic Church,
765 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding women seeking abortions are class protected
under Act); Southwestern Medical Clinics v. Operation Rescue, 744 F. Supp. 230 (D. Nev.
1989) (granting plaintiffs injunctive relief due to likelihood of success under Act); Cousins
v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding women are class protected by Act).
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S.Ct.
798 (1994) (holding Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") applies
to suits against abortion protestors); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d
57 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding RICO conviction).
5 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993), rev'g in part, vacating in part National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990).
6 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371-372; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985.
7 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Section 1985(3) states in full:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the
equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by
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In 1971, in Griffen v. Breckenridge, the United States Supreme
Court held that § 1985(3) is not limited to state action, but, rather, encompasses private conspiracies that involve "invidiously discriminatory
motivation" aimed at "a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all."' The Court stated that Congress had the power
to punish private conspiracies under its power to regulate interstate
travel, as well9 as under the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
l0
However, recently in Bray v.Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
the Supreme Court held that § 1985(3) did not provide a federal cause of
action for persons attempting to recover damages from protestors who
obstruct access to abortion clinics." In Bray, several abortion clinics
and organizations (the "Plaintiffs") failed to demonstrate that abortion
protest is equivalent to racial discrimination as a class-based, invidi12
ously discriminatory animus which motivated the protestors' actions.
The Court found that the demonstrations by Operation Rescue and other
individuals (the "Defendants") were not specifically targeted toward women, but, rather, were intended to protect the victims of abortion, to stop
3
the practice of abortion, and to reverse the legalization of abortion.' Indeed, it was noted that many common and respectable reasons for opposforce, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from
giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the
election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or VicePresident, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any
citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States,
the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
Id.
8 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). This case was remanded to determine the purpose of the conspiracy. Id. at 107.
9 Id. at 104-06. In Griffen, the court found that the defendants, white citizens of Mississippi, "wilfully ... and maliciously conspired ... to block the passage of [the] plaintiffs,"
Negro citizens of Mississippi, in order to stop and detain them, and, ultimately, to injure
them with deadly force. Id. at 90. The defendants "wilfully ... and maliciously . . . assaulted.., the... plaintiffs by pointing firearms and wielding deadly blackjacks, pipes or
other kind[s] of clubs, while uttering threats to kill and injure [the] plaintiffs .... and
club[bing] each of [them] on .... the head, severely injuring all of them." Id. at 91.
10 113 S.Ct. 753.
11 Id. at 768.
12 Id. at 758.
13 Id. at 760.
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ing abortion exist other than presenting a derogatory view of women as a
class. 4
II.

SUMMARY OF

BRAY v.

ALEXANDRmL

WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC

Bray was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia under the name of NOW v.OperationRescue,' 5 when
several abortion clinics and organizations sued Operation Rescue and
other individuals who were opposed to abortions and "deeply committed
to taking active steps to advance their views"-steps which often included rescue demonstrations. 1 6 At one particular "rescue," the demonstrators, or "rescuers," intentionally trespassed on an abortion clinic's
premises with the intent7 to block its entrances and exits, thereby effectively closing the clinic.'
Periodically during November 1989, the Defendants planned a series of rallies, meetings, and rescues which prompted the Plaintiffs' action. I8 The Plaintiffs claimed trespass, tortious interference with business relations, and public nuisance under state law. In addition,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants conspired to deny women their constitutional rights to travel, privacy, and abortion services. 9 On November 9, 1989, the district court
14 Id. The court noted that this is evident from the fact that there are men and women on
both sides of the petitioners' demonstrations. Id.
15 NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), affd, 914 F.2d 582, rev'd
in part, vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S.Ct. 753.
16 Id. at 1488. The plaintiffs included abortion clinics in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, including the Alexandria Women's Health Center, along with other organizational plaintiffs, including the National Organization for Women (the "Plaintiffs").
Id. at 1487. The defendants included Operation Rescue, Randall Terry, the founder of Operation Rescue, and Michael and Jayne Bray, who organized rescues in the Washington
metropolitan area (the "Defendants"). Id. at 1488. See John W. Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and OperationRescue: A Historicaland Theoretical Analysis, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
77 (1991) (discussing Operation Rescue's historical background and several major theories
regarding civil disobedience).
17 NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1487. All the Defendants "share a deep
commitment to the goals of stopping the practice of abortion and reversing its legalization."
Id. at 1488. "No one has put this point any better than Defendant Terry, who in an affidavit, states that 'while the child-killing facility is blockaded, no one is permitted to enter
past the rescuers.'" Id. "Operation Rescue's literature defines 'rescues' as physically blockading abortion mills with [human] bodies, to intervene between abortionists and the innocent victims." Id. at 1488 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). At one of the largest
rescues in the area in 1988, rescuers trespassed and physically blocked entrances and exits
to the abortion clinic, defaced signs, damaged fences, and blocked the abortion clinic's parking lot by parking a car in the lot entrance and deflating its tires. Id. at 1489-90.
18 Id. at 1490.
19 Id. at 1490-91.
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granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting rescue activities in
northern Virginia during the effectiveness of the order.20
On December 6, 1989, the district court granted a permanent injunction. However, the injunction did not apply nationwide and did not ex21
tend to activities that merely expressed views on the issue of abortion.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the district court based its permanent
injunction on the deprivation of the right to travel. However, the court
expressed no opinion on the merits of the Plaintiffs' argument, based on
22
the asserted fundamental right to an abortion.
In September 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.2 3 The court held that, though
the Defendants' activities were designed to express their beliefs, they
had "crossed the line from persuasion [to] coercion."2 4 The Fourth Circuit, like the district court, found that the Defendants' activities infringed upon women's right to travel and, thus, constituted a violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).25 The Fourth Circuit also failed to reach the issue of
whether 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) applied to an asserted violation of the right
26
of privacy.
In October 1991, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic and heard oral arguments without
20 See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1990).

21 NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1498. The court held that nationwide injunctive relief was "overbroad" and that "variation in state laws" coupled with difficulty in enforcing such an injunction militated against granting such an injunction. Id. at 1497. The
court noted that 'Defendants have a significant First Amendment right to express their
views on the.., issue of abortion and nothing in the permanent injunction should be construed to limit that right." Id. Anyone violating the injunction would be subject to imprisonment and fined $1,500. Id. at 1498.
22 Id. at 1493-94. The court noted that the right to travel includes the right to "unobstructed interstate travel to obtain an abortion and other medical services." Id. at 1493
(citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)). The court found that the "conspiracy ...effectively deprive[d] organizational [P]laintiffs' non-Virginia members of their right to interstate travel." Id. The district court found a cause of action for injunctive relief under the
state claims of trespass and public nuisance, and did not reach the merits of the tortious
interference with business relationships claim. Id. at 1495. Moreover, the Plaintiffs did not
allege facts sufficient to establish that cause of action. Id. Because there were other
grounds available upon which to decide the case, the court declined to address the constitutional issue of whether the rescue demonstrations infringed on the Plaintiffs' constitutional
right to obtain an abortion. Id. at 1494.
23 NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d at 582.
24 Id. at 585 (citing NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1492-93).
25 Id. at 585-86.
26 Id. at 586. In addition, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to
broaden the scope of the injunction to include activities that tend to intimidate, harass, or
disturb patients or potential patients. In the court"s view, such an expansion would risk
enjoining activities clearly protected by the First Amendment. Id.
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Justice Thomas present.
Further arguments were heard by the full
Court in October 1992.28 On January 13, 1993, the Court decided that 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) did not provide a federal cause of action against persons
obstructing access to abortion clinics. 29
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, and Thomas, explained that to prove
a private conspiracy in violation of the first clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),
commonly known as the "deprivation" clause, a plaintiff must show that
"'some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators' action.' "30 Moreover, the
plaintiff must show that the conspiracy was aimed at interfering with
rights that are protected against both private and official encroachment.3 1 The Court held that neither element was proven by the
32
Plaintiffs.
The Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' assertion that opposition to abortion qualifies as an "otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus" tantamount to racial discrimination. 33 Rejecting the district
court's opinion, the Court held that women seeking abortions do not
qualify as a class within the meaning of § 1985(3). 34 In its view, the
class requirement "unquestionably connotes something more than a
group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the
§ 1985(3) defendant disfavors."3" To rule otherwise, the Court explained, would allow innumerable tort plaintiffs to bring a § 1985(3)
claim simply by defining a "class" as individuals engaging in an activity
that the defendants disagreed with. This result would thus improperly
convert a § 1985(3) claim into a general, federal tort claim.36 According
to the Court, the goal of preventing abortion did not deserve "such harsh
37
description" or "derogatory association with racism."
27 60 U.S.L.W. 3331 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1991).
28 61 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1992).
29 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
30 Id. at 758 (quoting Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 102). See supra notes 8-9 and
accompanying text (discussing Griffen).
31 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758 (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Farmers of Am. v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)).
32 Id.

at 759.

33 Id.
34 Id.

35 Id.
36 113 S. Ct. at 759. The rescues were not directed specifically at women, but, more precisely, at the goal of stopping abortion and reversing its legalization. Id. Moreover, men
and women stand on both sides of the abortion issue, and both sexes demonstrate unlawfully against abortion. Id. at 760.
37 Id. at 762.
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After analyzing the second requirement of a private conspiracy, the
Court rejected the Plaintiffs' assertions that the rescuers attempted to
interfere with the constitutional rights that protect against private encroachment.3 s While the Plaintiffs and lower courts based their arguments on the right to interstate travel, a right which is constitutionally
protected in some contexts, the Court concluded that the Defendants' opposition to abortion existed regardless of the relationship between the
abortion and interstate travel. 3 9 Indeed, further rescues do not and
would not affect the right to travel from state to state. 40 Moreover, the
Court summarily held that the deprivation of the right to an abortion
cannot form the basis of a purely private conspiracy.4 1
Justice Souter concurred in part and dissented in part.4 2 He agreed
with the majority's interpretation of the "deprivation" clause of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) and its conclusion that abortion protesters do not fall within its
provisions.4 3 However, Justice Souter stated that the Court should have
considered the second clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), commonly known as
the "prevention" clause.4 4 The prevention clause sanctions conspiracies
that prevent the constitutional authorities of any state from giving or
securing equal protection to all of its citizens. The Plaintiffs' request at
the reargument to file a supplemental brief on the prevention clause was
denied. Justice Souter, however, voted to grant the request, arguing
that the prevention clause should not be interpreted as narrowly as the
38 Id. at 760.
39 Id. at 763. The Court noted that it "does not suffice for application of § 1985(3) that a
protected right be incidentally affected." Id. at 762. It "must be a conscious objective of the
enterprise" to deprive a protected right. Id. The Court held that there was no conspiracy to
violate the right of interstate travel. Id.
40 Id. at 762-63. The only actual barriers raised by the rescues affect intrastate, not interstate, travel. Id. at 763. Even if such barriers were raised intentionally against travelers
from other states, they would have to be discriminatorily applied against such travelers. Id.
As Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument, barriers were not raised discriminatorily against
travelers from other states. Id.
41 113 S. Ct. at 764. The district court declined to rule on this, relying on the interstate
travel theory. Id. The Court concluded that the "right to abortion was assuredly 'aimed at'
by the petitioners," but the deprivation of that right could not be the object of a "purely
private conspiracy." Id.
42 Id. at 769 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
43 Id. at 770 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The "deprivation" clause
covers conspiracies "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws." Id. at 769 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
44 Id. at 775 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The "prevention" clause
covers conspiracies, "for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities
of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 769 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
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deprivation clause.4 5 He concluded that the Fourth Circuit's decision
should be vacated and the case remanded to determine whether the rescuers' demonstrations were in fact actionable under the prevention
clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).46
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, 4 7 found that the majority had construed the first portion of the
statute too narrowly. In his view, the Defendants' conduct denied every
woman the opportunity to exercise a constitutional right that only women possess. 48 Moreover, Justice Stevens believed that the Plaintiffs
had unquestionably
established a claim under the second portion of 42
49
U.S.C. § 1985(3).
Finally, Justice O'Connor dissented, with Justice Blackmun again
joining, arguing that the Defendants' activities fell squarely within the
ambit of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).50 Justice O'Connor maintained that women are a protected class under the statute and the conspiracy's motivation was directly related to characteristics unique to that class. 5 1 In her
view, the conspiracy was class-based and impeded local law enforcement
from securing
equal protection of the law to clinics and the women they
52
serve.

III.

CLINIC ACCESS LEGISLATION

In response to the Bray decision, in June 1994, the United States
Congress enacted the "Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of
1994" (the "Clinic Access Act"). 53 In part, the Clinic Access Act is
45 Id. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
46 113 S. Ct. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Souter
recognized that a racial or other class-based animus is a necessary requirement for the
deprivation clause, otherwise the statute might develop into general federal tort law. Id. at
775 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). While the Court has never faced a
prevention clause claim, Justice Souter believed that the prevention clause does not require the conspirators' animus to be based on race or other class characteristics. Id. at 77677 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
47 Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 792-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49 See id. at 795 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that § 1985(3) provides a

federal remedy for the defendants' violent concerted activities. Id. at 780 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
50 Id. at 799 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51 113 S. Ct. at 799 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that Bray is neither about
abortion nor about the disfavoring of abortion by state legislatures. Id. at 804 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). Rather, she explained, Bray "is about whether a private conspiracy to deprive members of a protected class of legally protected interests gives rise to a federal cause
of action." Justice O'Connor answered this inquiry in the affirmative. Id.
53 Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248) (the "Clinic Access
Act"). See Marcia Coyle & Chris Carmody, Hill Leaders Plan to Seek Klan Law" Reversal,
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designed to supplement existing civil rights laws by criminalizing the
physical obstruction of a medical facility or the use of force with the intent to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any person seeking to provide
or obtain reproductive health services.5 4 If convicted under the Clinic
Access Act, a defendant could be fined, imprisoned for up to a year, or
both.5 " A repeat offender could be fined, imprisoned for up to three
years, or both. 6 The statute also mitigates penalties for nonviolent

NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25, 1993, at 5 (discussing Supreme Court's refusal to extend civil rights
protection to abortion clinics).
54 Section 248(a) of the Clinic Access Act states:
(a) Prohibited Activities. - Whoever (1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or
interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order
to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons
from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services;
(2) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or
interfere with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the
First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship; or
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health services, or intentionally damages or destroys the property of a place of religious worship,
shall be subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) and the civil remedies provided in subsection (c), except that a parent or legal guardian of a minor shall not be subject to any penalties or civil remedies under this section for
such activities insofar as they are directed exclusively at that minor.
108 Stat. at 694-95 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)).
55 Section 248(b) of the Clinic Access Act provides:
(b) Penalties. - Whoever violates this section shall (1) in the case of a first offense, be fined in accordance with this title,
or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
(2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense after a prior conviction under this section, be fined in accordance with this title, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both;
except that for an offense involving exclusively a nonviolent physical obstruction, the fine shall be not more than $10,000 and the length of imprisonment
shall be not more than six months, or both, for the first offense; and the fine
shall be not more than $25,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not
more than 18 months, or both, for a subsequent offense; and except that if bodily injury results, the length of imprisonment shall be not more than 10 years,
and if death results, it shall be for any term of years or for life.
108 Stat. at 695 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)).
56 See 108 Stat. at 695 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)(2)).
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physical obstructions, while imposing greater penalties for acts resulting
in bodily injury or death. 7
In addition, the Clinic Access Act provides for civil remedies for persons "aggrieved" by conduct prohibited under the statute.5 s Plaintiffs
may seek injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys fees and costs. 59 Prior to a final judgment, plaintiffs recovering compensatory damages 60may, instead, elect to
receive statutory damages of $5,000 per violation.
The Clinic Access Act further allows for both the United States Attorney General and state attorneys general to bring civil actions in
United States District Courts to seek injunctive relief or compensatory
damages for persons "aggrieved" by acts prohibited under the statute.6 1
57 See 108 Stat. at 695 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)). On October 5, 1994, Paul Hill
was the first person convicted under the Clinic Access Act for shooting and killing a doctor,
Dr. John Britton, and his bodyguard outside the Pensicola, Florida clinic where Britton
performed abortions. See The Week: Abortion Violence, TIME, Oct. 17, 1994, at 17. Mr. Hill
was later convicted on state murder charges and currently faces sentencing under Florida's
death penalty. Mireya Navarro, Jury Votes for Death Penaltyfor Abortion Foe, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1994, at A20. Id.
58 Subsection 248(c)(1)(A) of the Clinic Access Act provides, in part:
(c) Civil Remedies. (1) Right of Action. (A) In General. - Any person aggrieved by reason of the conduct
prohibited by subsection (a) may commence a civil action for the relief
set forth in subparagraph (B), except that such an action may be
brought under subsection (a)(1) only by a person involved in providing
or seeking to provide, or obtaining or seeking to obtain, services in a
facility that provides reproductive health services, and such an action
may be brought under subsection (a)(2) only by a person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious
freedom at a place of religious worship or by the entity that owns or
operates such place of religious worship.
108 Stat. at 695 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(A)).
59 Subsection 248(c)(1)(B) of the Clinic Access Act provides, in part:
(c) Civil Remedies. (1) Right of Action. (B) Relief. - In any action under subparagraph (A), the court may
award appropriate relief, including temporary, preliminary or permanent injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages, as well
as the costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses....
108 Stat. at 695 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(B)).
60 Subsection 248(c)(1)(B) states that "[w]ith respect to compensatory damages, the plaintiff may elect, at any time prior to the rendering of final judgment, to recover, in lieu of
actual damages, an award of statutory damages in the amount of 5,000 per violation." 108
Stat. at 695 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(B)).
61 Subsection 248(c) states, in part:
(c) Civil Remedies. -
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In such actions, the court may also impose penalties of up to $15,000
against first offenders and up to $25,000 for each subsequent violation.6 2
The Clinic Access Act exempts activities protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution,6 3 and further specifies
that it is not intended to expand or limit remedies for First Amendment
violations occurring outside a reproductive health facility.64 Also, the
statute does not preempt state remedies or interfere with the enforcement of state and local reproductive health laws.6 5
(2) Action by Attorney General of the United States. (A) In General. - If the Attorney General of the United States has
reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is being,
has been, or may be injured by conduct constituting a violation of this
section, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any appropriate United States District Court.
(B) Relief. - In any action under subparagraph (A), the court may
award appropriate relief, including temporary, preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, and compensatory damages to persons aggrieved
as described in paragraph (1)(B). The court, to vindicate the public interest, may also assess a civil penalty against each respondent (i) in an amount not exceeding $10,000 for a nonviolent physical obstruction and $15,000 for other first violations; and
(ii) in an amount not exceeding $15,000 for a nonviolent physical obstruction and $25,000 for any other subsequent violation.
(3) Actions by state attorneys general. (A) In General. - If the Attorney Genneral of a State has reasonable
cause to believe that any person or group of persons is being, has been,
or may be injured by conduct constituting a violation of this section,
such Attorney General may commence a civil action in the name of such
State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such
State, in any appropriate United States District Court.
(B) Relief. - In any action under subparagraph (A), the court may
award appropriate relief, including temporary, preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and civil penalties as described in paragraph (2)(B).
108 Stat. at 695-96 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)).
62 See 108 Stat. 695-96 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(2)(B)).
63 Subsection 248(d)(1) of the Clinic Access Act states that the statute "shall [not] be construed.., to prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal prohibition by the First Amendment to the Constitution." 108 Stat. at 696 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(1)).
64 Subsection 248(d)(2) provides that the Clinic Access Act "shall [not] be construed.., to
create new remedies for interference with activities protected by the free speech or free
exercise clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution, occurring outside a facility,
regardless of the point of view expressed, or to limit any existing legal remedies for such
interference." 108 Stat. at 696 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(2)).
65 Subsection 248(d) of the Clinic Access Act states that the statute shall not "provide exclusive criminal penalties or civil remedies with respect to the conduct prohibited by [the
statute], or to preempt State or local laws that may provide such penalties or remedies" nor
"interfere with the enforcement of State or local laws regulating the performance of abor-
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It is submitted that the Clinic Access Act is troublesome for several
reasons. First, such a statute is not necessary. Abortion clinics can resort to state tort causes of action, such as nuisance and trespass, to combat anti-abortion protestors. 66 Moreover, the federal government currently has 67
the option of using federal resources and marshals to control
protestors.
Second, the Clinic Access Act is discriminatory. Though the statute
indicates that it will not interfere with conduct protected by the First
Amendment,6" it singles out anti-abortion protestors for federal criminal
and civil sanctions. There, for example, are no comparable federal statutes aimed expressly against animal rights activists who gain access to
medical research facilities, or prohibiting violence against anti-abortion
protestors. Thus, this bill discriminates against anti-abortion protestors
primarily due to the content of their expression and beliefs underlying
their protest.
Finally, the imposition of criminal penalties of up to one year imprisonment for a first offense, as well as fines of up to $15,000, compensatory
and punitive damages, and attorneys fees and expenses, are extraordinarily harsh.6 9
CONCLUSION

In Bray, the Supreme Court ruled that anti-abortion protestors cannot be sued under the Ku Klux Klan Act. However, anti-abortion activists who remain within the bounds of protected free speech and free assembly still may be responsible under state civil and criminal trespass
and nuisance laws, and federal assistance may be requested to assist
state law enforcement officials in controlling illegal protest activities.
Despite Bray, however, with the passage of the Clinic Access Act,
anti-abortion protestors are still subject to suit under federal law. The
Clinic Access Act singles out anti-abortion protest as a federal crime, discriminatorily imposing civil remedies and criminal sanctions based on
the content of demonstrators' expression. This author strongly criticizes
this legislation because it goes beyond those remedies which were
granted by the Fourth Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) in Bray-remedies which the Supreme Court subsequently held were not properly
available.

tions or other reproductive health services." 108 Stat. at 696 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 248(d)(3), (4)).
66 See supra notes 2 and 57 accompanying text.
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
68 See supra note 63.
69 See supra notes 55 & 59-61.

